CVERadar
CRITICAL · CVSS 4.0 9.3CISA KEV · added 2026-09-22Public PoCEPSS 2.23% (p83)Threat level 62

CVE-2026-94127: F5 BIG-IP APM Heap-based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

F5 · BIG-IP APM · NVD published 2026-09-22 · posted 2026-09-22 · last modified 2026-09-23

What it is

When a BIG-IP APM access policy and an OAuth profile are configured on a virtual server, specific malicious traffic can lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is only present when BIG-IP APM is configured as an OAuth Authorization Server. Deployments using APM strictly as an OAuth Client / Resource Server (without OAuth authorization server profiles configured) are not affected by this vulnerability. Impact: This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to perform remote code execution. The BIG-IP system in Appliance mode is also vulnerable. This is a data plane issue; there is no control plane exposure. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

WeaknessCWE-122
CVSS vectorCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X (source: [email protected])
CISA due date2026-09-25 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone)
ATT&CK tacticsInitial Access → Execution

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2026-09-22 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

  • CISA KEV: listed since 2026-09-22. Source

Public exploit code

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories

2 public repositories from 2 accounts, first seen 2026-09-23. Most starred: watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-f5-bigip-PreAuth-RCE-CVE-2026-94127 (15 stars), view repository.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: CISA KEV · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2026-94127 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 62/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/2

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Inferred

Inferred from description keywords

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

  • f5 big-ip access policy manager: versions up to and including 17.1.3 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
  • f5 big-ip access policy manager: versions up to and including 17.5.1 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190, T1203) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
  • M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
  • M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
  • M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
  • M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
  • M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190, T1203) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
  • M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
  • M1051 Update Software (for T1190, T1203) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
  • Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources