CVERadar
HIGH · CVSS 3.1 7.7Exploit-DBEPSS 0.56% (p46)Threat level 46

CVE-2026-36355: CVE-2026-36355: The rtl8192cd Wi-Fi kernel driver in the Realtek rtl819x Jungle SDK (all known versions th…

Unknown · · NVD published 2026-05-05 · posted 2026-05-27 · last modified 2026-07-05

What it is

The rtl8192cd Wi-Fi kernel driver in the Realtek rtl819x Jungle SDK (all known versions through v3.4.14B) does not perform any access control checks on the write_mem (ioctl 0x89F5) and read_mem (ioctl 0x89F6) debug handlers, which are compiled into production builds via the unconditionally defined _IOCTL_DEBUG_CMD_ macro in 8192cd_cfg.h

WeaknessCWE-200CWE-782CWE-787
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (source: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0)
ATT&CK tacticsExecution → Collection

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2026-05-27 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).

Public exploit code

Exploit-DB

  • EDB-52580: Realtek rtl819x - Local Privilege (2026-05-27)

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories below quality bar

1 public repositories from 1 accounts, first seen 2026-05-05.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: Exploit-DB (OffSec) · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2026-36355 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 46/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/2

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Inferred

Inferred from CWE CWE-787

How to fix it

Fixed versions

NVD does not list a fixed version for this CVE. Use the vendor advisory below.

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

No vendor-tagged reference yet; see the full reference list.

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1203) : Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploi
  • M1051 Update Software (for T1203) : Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Keeping software up-to-date with the latest security patches helps prevent adversaries from exploiting known vulnerabilities in client software, reducing the risk of successful attacks.
  • M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1203) : Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. Risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in those systems may still exist.
  • M1057 Data Loss Prevention (for T1005) : Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.
  • Collection: Watch for bulk reads of databases, file shares or mailboxes by the affected service.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources