CVE-2026-33439: CVE-2026-33439: Open Access Management (OpenAM) is an access management solution. Prior to 16.0.6, OpenIde…
openidentityplatform · openam · NVD published 2026-04-08 · posted 2026-04-27 · last modified 2026-07-25
What it is
Open Access Management (OpenAM) is an access management solution. Prior to 16.0.6, OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM is vulnerable to pre-authentication Remote Code Execution (RCE) via unsafe Java deserialization of the jato.clientSession HTTP parameter. This bypasses the WhitelistObjectInputStream mitigation that was applied to the jato.pageSession parameter after CVE-2021-35464. An unauthenticated attacker can achieve arbitrary command execution on the server by sending a crafted serialized Java object as the jato.clientSession GET/POST parameter to any JATO ViewBean endpoint whose JSP contains <jato:form> tags (e.g., the Password Reset pages). This vulnerability is fixed in 16.0.6.
| Weakness | CWE-502 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X (source: [email protected]) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Initial Access → Execution |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2026-04-27 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).
Public exploit code
GitHub proof-of-concept repositories
7 public repositories from 7 accounts, first seen 2026-04-27. Most starred: TheMalwareGuardian/CVE-2026-33439 (11 stars), view repository.
Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.
Sources: nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.
How to fix it
Fixed versions
- openidentityplatform openam: upgrade to 16.0.6 or later
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/security/advisories/GHSA-2cqq-rpvq-g5qj (Exploit, Vendor Advisory)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190, T1203) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
- M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
- M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190, T1059) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
- M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190, T1203) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1190, T1203) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
- M1033 Limit Software Installation (for T1059) : Prevent user installation of unrequired command and scripting interpreters.
- M1045 Code Signing (for T1059) : Where possible, only permit execution of signed scripts.
Detection Generic guidance
- Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
- Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.