CVE-2026-20316: Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Use of Hard-coded Password Vulnerability
Cisco · Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) · NVD published 2026-07-29 · posted 2026-07-29 · last modified 2026-09-17
What it is
A vulnerability in the web interface of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to log in to an affected device using a low-privileged account to access sensitive data within the impacted systems. This vulnerability is due to the presence of static user credentials for a low-privileged account. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using the account to log in to an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to log in to the affected system and access sensitive data as the low-privileged user. Note: If the FMC management interface does not have public internet access, the attack surface that is associated with this vulnerability is reduced. Cisco has assigned this security advisory a Security Impact Rating (SIR) of High rather than Medium as the score indicates. The reason is that this vulnerability can be used with other Cisco Secure FMC Software vulnerabilities to elevate privileges.
| Weakness | CWE-259 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (source: [email protected]) |
| CISA due date | 2026-08-01 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Initial Access |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2026-07-29 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
- CISA KEV: listed since 2026-07-29. Source
Sources: CISA KEV.
Defend the Chain
The attack chain for CVE-2026-20316 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.
Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.
Defend against T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Inferred
Inferred from description keywords (network-reachable flaw)
How to fix it
CISA required action
Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines. (source: CISA KEV)
Fixed versions
- cisco secure firewall management center: versions up to and including 7.0.9 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
- cisco secure firewall management center: versions up to and including 7.2.11 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
- cisco secure firewall management center: versions up to and including 7.3.1.2 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
- cisco secure firewall management center: versions up to and including 7.4.7 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
- cisco secure firewall management center: versions up to and including 7.6.5 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
- cisco secure firewall management center: versions up to and including 7.7.12 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
- cisco secure firewall management center: versions up to and including 10.0.1 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-static-cred-BET3Cjh (CISA KEV notes)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
- M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
- M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
- M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1190) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
Detection Generic guidance
- Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.