CVE-2026-20128: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Storing Passwords in a Recoverable Format Vulnerability

What it is

A vulnerability in the Data Collection Agent (DCA) feature of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain DCA user privileges on an affected system. This vulnerability is due to the presence of a credential file for the DCA user on an affected system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request and reading the file that contains the DCA password from that affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access another affected system and gain DCA user privileges. Note: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager releases 20.18 and later are not affected by this vulnerability.

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2026-04-20 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

• CISA KEV: listed since 2026-04-20. Source

Sources: CISA KEV.

How to fix it

CISA required action

Please adhere to CISA’s guidelines to assess exposure and mitigate risks associated with Cisco SD-WAN devices as outlines in CISA’s Emergency Directive 26-03 (URL listed below in Notes) and CISA’s “Hunt & Hardening Guidance for Cisco SD-WAN Devices (URL listed below in Notes). Adhere to the applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are not available. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

• cisco catalyst sd-wan manager: upgrade to 20.9.8.2 or later
• cisco catalyst sd-wan manager: upgrade to 20.12.5.3 or later (affected from 20.10)
• cisco catalyst sd-wan manager: upgrade to 20.15.4.2 or later (affected from 20.13)
• cisco catalyst sd-wan manager: upgrade to 20.18 or later (affected from 20.16)

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

• https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-authbp-qwCX8D4v (CISA KEV notes)

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

• M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
• M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
• M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
• M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
• M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
• M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
• M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
• M1051 Update Software (for T1190) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.

Detection Generic guidance

• Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.

Response checklist Generic guidance

1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.