CVERadar
CRITICAL · CVSS 3.1 9.6EPSS 0.61% (p50)Threat level 48

CVE-2026-17297: CVE-2026-17297: IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a rem…

Unknown · IBM API Connect · NVD published 2026-11-07 · posted 2026-11-07 · last modified 2026-11-07

CVE-2026-17297 at a glance

CVE-2026-17297 is a critical-severity Open Redirect vulnerability in IBM API Connect, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.6. NVD published it on 2026-11-07 and classifies the weakness as CWE-601. FIRST EPSS puts the probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days at 0.61% (percentile 49.6, scored 2026-11-09). NVD does not list a fixed version, so the vendor advisory is the reference for the fix. CVERadar maps 1 MITRE ATT&CK technique across Initial Access, inferred from the CWE and the description. Its CVERadar threat level is 48/100.

What it is

IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote attacker to perform an account takeover due to an open redirect vulnerability. The redirect address used during sign-in is not sufficiently validated, which could allow authentication results to be sent to an attacker-controlled location.

WeaknessCWE-601 definition
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (source: CNA (us.ibm.com))
ATT&CK tacticsInitial Access

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2026-17297 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 48/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/1

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Inferred

Inferred from CWE CWE-601

Patches, mitigations and detection

Fixed versions

NVD does not list a fixed version for this CVE. Use the vendor advisory below.

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

No vendor-tagged reference yet; see the full reference list.

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1054 Software Configuration (for T1566.002) : Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform simil
  • M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content (for T1566.002) : Determine if certain websites that can be used for spearphishing are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.
  • M1047 Audit (for T1566.002) : Audit applications and their permissions to ensure access to data and resources are limited based upon necessity and principle of least privilege.
  • M1018 User Account Management (for T1566.002) : Azure AD Administrators apply limitations upon the ability for users to grant consent to unfamiliar or unverified third-party applications.
  • M1017 User Training (for T1566.002) : Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links which includes phishing for consent with OAuth 2.0. Additionally, users may perform visual checks of the domains they visit; however, homographs in ASCII and in IDN domains and URL schema obfuscation may render

Detection Generic guidance

  • Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources