CVE-2025-8311: CVE-2025-8311: dotCMS versions 24.03.22 and after, identified a Boolean-based blind SQLi vulnerability in…

What it is

dotCMS versions 24.03.22 and after, identified a Boolean-based blind SQLi vulnerability in the /api/v1/contenttype endpoint. This endpoint uses the sites query parameter, which accepts a comma-separated list of site identifiers or keys. The vulnerability was triggered via the sites parameter, which was directly concatenated into a SQL query without proper sanitization. Exploitation allowed an authenticated attacker with low privileges to extract data from database, perform privilege escalation, or trigger denial-of-service conditions. The vulnerability was verified using tools such as SQLMap and confirmed to allow full database exfiltration and potential denial-of-service conditions via crafted payloads. The vulnerability is fixed in the following versions of dotCMS stack: 25.08.14 / 25.07.10-1v2 LTS / 24.12.27v10 LTS / 24.04.24v21 LTS

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2025-09-16 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).

Public exploit code

Exploit-DB

• EDB-52431: dotCMS 25.07.02-1 - Authenticated Blind SQL Injection (2025-09-16)

Sources: Exploit-DB (OffSec).

How to fix it

Fixed versions

NVD does not list a fixed version for this CVE. Use the vendor advisory below.

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

No vendor-tagged reference yet; see the full reference list.

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

• M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190, T1068) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
• M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190, T1499) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
• M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
• M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
• M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
• M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190, T1068) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
• M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
• M1051 Update Software (for T1190, T1068) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
• M1019 Threat Intelligence Program (for T1068) : Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization.
• M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1068) : Consider blocking the execution of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may exploit to execute code in kernel mode. Validate driver block rules in audit mode to ensure stability prior to production deployment.

Detection Generic guidance

• Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
• Privilege Escalation: Alert on processes gaining SYSTEM/root unexpectedly, and on exploitation crashes of privileged services.
• Collection: Watch for bulk reads of databases, file shares or mailboxes by the affected service.
• Impact: Monitor service availability, unexpected encryption activity and mass file changes.

Response checklist Generic guidance

1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.