CVERadar
CRITICAL · CVSS 4.0 9.3CISA KEV · added 2025-10-22EPSS 2.77% (p86)Threat level 62

CVE-2025-61932: Motex LANSCOPE Endpoint Manager Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel Vulnerability

Motex · LANSCOPE Endpoint Manager · NVD published 2025-10-20 · posted 2025-10-22 · last modified 2026-10-09

What it is

Lanscope Endpoint Manager (On-Premises) (Client program (MR) and Detection agent (DA)) improperly verifies the origin of incoming requests, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code by sending specially crafted packets.

WeaknessCWE-940
CVSS vectorCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X (source: [email protected])
CISA due date2025-11-12 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone)
ATT&CK tacticsExecution

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2025-10-22 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

  • CISA KEV: listed since 2025-10-22. Source

Sources: CISA KEV.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2025-61932 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 62/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/1

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege Escalation

Stealth

Defense Impairment

Credential Access

Discovery

Lateral Movement

Collection

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution Inferred

Inferred from description keywords

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.3.2.7 or later
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.3.3.9 or later (affected from 9.3.3.0)
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.4.0.5 or later (affected from 9.4.0.0)
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.4.1.5 or later (affected from 9.4.1.0)
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.4.2.6 or later (affected from 9.4.2.0)
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.4.3.8 or later (affected from 9.4.3.0)
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.4.4.6 or later (affected from 9.4.4.0)
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.4.5.4 or later (affected from 9.4.5.0)
  • motex lanscope endpoint manager: upgrade to 9.4.6.3 or later (affected from 9.4.6.0)

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1203) : Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploi
  • M1051 Update Software (for T1203) : Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Keeping software up-to-date with the latest security patches helps prevent adversaries from exploiting known vulnerabilities in client software, reducing the risk of successful attacks.
  • M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1203) : Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. Risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in those systems may still exist.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources