CVE-2025-47226: CVE-2025-47226: Grokability Snipe-IT before 8.1.0 has incorrect authorization for accessing asset informat…
snipeitapp · snipe-it · NVD published 2025-05-03 · posted 2025-05-06 · last modified 2026-06-17
What it is
Grokability Snipe-IT before 8.1.0 has incorrect authorization for accessing asset information.
| Weakness | CWE-425CWE-639 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (source: [email protected]) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Initial Access |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2025-05-06 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).
Public exploit code
Exploit-DB
- EDB-52282: Grokability Snipe-IT 8.0.4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) (2025-05-06)
GitHub proof-of-concept repositories below quality bar
1 public repositories from 1 accounts, first seen 2025-05-03.
Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.
Sources: Exploit-DB (OffSec) · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.
Defend the Chain
The attack chain for CVE-2025-47226 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.
Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.
Defend against T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Inferred
Inferred from CWE CWE-639
How to fix it
Fixed versions
- snipeitapp snipe-it: upgrade to 8.1.0 or later
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/releases/tag/v8.1.0 (Patch, Release Notes)
- https://github.com/koyomihack00/CVE-2025-47226/blob/main/PoC/idor-exploit.md (Exploit, Patch, Third Party Advisory)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
- M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
- M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
- M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1190) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
Detection Generic guidance
- Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.