CVE-2025-4427: Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

What it is

An authentication bypass in the API component of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile 12.5.0.0 and prior allows attackers to access protected resources without proper credentials via the API.

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2025-05-13 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

• CISA KEV: listed since 2025-05-19. Source

Public exploit code

Metasploit

• exploit/multi/http/ivanti_epmm_rce_cve_2025_4427_4428: Ivanti EPMM Authentication Bypass for Expression Language Remote Code Execution (disclosure 2025-05-13)

Exploit-DB

• EDB-52421: Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile 12.5.0.0 - Authentication Bypass (2025-08-26)

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories

2 public repositories from 2 accounts, first seen 2025-05-15. Most starred: watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-Ivanti-EPMM-CVE-2025-4427-CVE-2025-4428 (11 stars), view repository.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: CISA KEV · Rapid7 Metasploit Framework module metadata · Exploit-DB (OffSec) · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

• ivanti endpoint manager mobile: upgrade to 11.12.0.5 or later
• ivanti endpoint manager mobile: upgrade to 12.3.0.2 or later (affected from 12.3.0.0)
• ivanti endpoint manager mobile: upgrade to 12.4.0.2 or later (affected from 12.4.0.0)

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

• https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-Mobile-EPMM (CISA KEV notes)

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

• M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190, T1203) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
• M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
• M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
• M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
• M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190, T1059) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
• M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190, T1203) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
• M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
• M1051 Update Software (for T1190, T1203) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
• M1033 Limit Software Installation (for T1059) : Prevent user installation of unrequired command and scripting interpreters.
• M1045 Code Signing (for T1059) : Where possible, only permit execution of signed scripts.

Detection Generic guidance

• Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
• Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.
• Persistence: Look for new files in web roots, new scheduled tasks/services, and new accounts created after the exposure window.

Response checklist Generic guidance

1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.