CVE-2025-30005: CVE-2025-30005: Xorcom CompletePBX is vulnerable to a path traversal via the Diagnostics reporting module,…
xorcom · completepbx · NVD published 2025-03-31 · posted 2025-03-02 · last modified 2026-06-17
What it is
Xorcom CompletePBX is vulnerable to a path traversal via the Diagnostics reporting module, which will allow reading of arbitrary files and additionally delete any retrieved file in place of the expected report. This issue affects CompletePBX: all versions up to and prior to 5.2.35
| Weakness | CWE-22 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L (source: [email protected]) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Initial Access → Discovery |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2025-03-02 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).
Public exploit code
Metasploit
auxiliary/scanner/http/xorcom_completepbx_diagnostics_file_read: Xorcom CompletePBX Arbitrary File Read and Deletion via systemDataFileName (disclosure 2025-03-02)
Sources: Rapid7 Metasploit Framework module metadata.
Defend the Chain
The attack chain for CVE-2025-30005 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.
Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.
Defend against T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Inferred
Inferred from CWE CWE-22
How to fix it
Fixed versions
- xorcom completepbx: upgrade to 5.2.36.1 or later
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://www.xorcom.com/new-completepbx-release-5-2-36-1/ (Release Notes)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
- M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
- M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
- M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1190) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
Detection Generic guidance
- Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
- Discovery: Look for directory listing, file enumeration and reconnaissance commands from service accounts.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.