CVE-2025-27920: Srimax Output Messenger Directory Traversal Vulnerability
Srimax · Output Messenger · NVD published 2025-05-05 · posted 2025-05-19 · last modified 2026-06-17
What it is
Output Messenger before 2.0.63 was vulnerable to a directory traversal attack through improper file path handling. By using ../ sequences in parameters, attackers could access sensitive files outside the intended directory, potentially leading to configuration leakage or arbitrary file access.
| Weakness | CWE-24CWE-22 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (source: [email protected]) |
| CISA due date | 2025-06-09 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Initial Access → Discovery |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2025-05-19 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
- CISA KEV: listed since 2025-05-19. Source
Sources: CISA KEV.
Defend the Chain
The attack chain for CVE-2025-27920 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.
Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.
Defend against T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Inferred
Inferred from CWE CWE-22
How to fix it
CISA required action
Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. (source: CISA KEV)
Fixed versions
- srimax output messenger: upgrade to 2.0.63 or later
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://www.outputmessenger.com/cve-2025-27920/ (CISA KEV notes)
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/12/marbled-dust-leverages-zero-day-in-output-messenger-for-regional-espionage/ (Mitigation, Third Party Advisory)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
- M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
- M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
- M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1190) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
Detection Generic guidance
- Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
- Discovery: Look for directory listing, file enumeration and reconnaissance commands from service accounts.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.