CVE-2025-22224: VMware ESXi and Workstation TOCTOU Race Condition Vulnerability
VMware · ESXi and Workstation · NVD published 2025-03-04 · posted 2025-03-04 · last modified 2026-06-17
What it is
VMware ESXi, and Workstation contain a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use) vulnerability that leads to an out-of-bounds write. A malicious actor with local administrative privileges on a virtual machine may exploit this issue to execute code as the virtual machine's VMX process running on the host.
| Weakness | CWE-367 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (source: [email protected]) |
| CISA due date | 2025-03-25 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Privilege Escalation → Stealth |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2025-03-04 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
- CISA KEV: listed since 2025-03-04. Source
Sources: CISA KEV.
Defend the Chain
The attack chain for CVE-2025-22224 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.
Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.
Defend against T1055 Process Injection CTID: exploitation technique
By exploiting the TOCTOU vulnerability in VMWare ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion, an attacker with local admin privileges can execute code in the VMX process on the host, in effect, functioning as an escape from the virtual machine to the host system.
How to fix it
CISA required action
Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. (source: CISA KEV)
Fixed versions
- vmware workstation: upgrade to 17.6.3 or later (affected from 17.0)
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25390 (CISA KEV notes)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1055, T1611) : Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux, grsecurit
- M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint (for T1055) : Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. For example, on Windows 10, Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules may prevent Office applications from code injection.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1611) : Ensure that hosts are kept up-to-date with security patches.
- M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1611) : Use read-only containers, read-only file systems, and minimal images when possible to prevent the running of commands. Where possible, also consider using application control and software restriction tools (such as those provided by SELinux) to restrict access to files, processes, and system calls in containers.
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1611) : Consider utilizing seccomp, seccomp-bpf, or a similar solution that restricts certain system calls such as mount. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that limit container access to host process namespaces, the host network, and the host file system.
- M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program (for T1611) : Remove unnecessary tools and software from containers.
Detection Generic guidance
- Privilege Escalation: Alert on processes gaining SYSTEM/root unexpectedly, and on exploitation crashes of privileged services.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.