CVERadar
HIGH · CVSS 4.0 7.1CISA KEV · added 2025-12-15Metasploit moduleEPSS 53.30% (p99)Threat level 66

CVE-2025-14611: Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox Hard Coded Cryptographic Vulnerability

Gladinet · CentreStack and Triofox · NVD published 2025-12-13 · posted 2025-12-15 · last modified 2026-10-08

What it is

Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox prior to version 16.12.10420.56791 used hardcoded values for their implementation of the AES cryptoscheme. This degrades security for public exposed endpoints that may make use of it and may offer arbitrary local file inclusion when provided a specially crafted request without authentication. This opens the door for future exploitation and can be leveraged with previous vulnerabilities to gain a full system compromise.

WeaknessCWE-798
CVSS vectorCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:A/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X (source: 5dacb0b8-2277-4717-899c-254586fe4912)
CISA due date2026-01-05 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone)
ATT&CK tacticsInitial Access → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Stealth

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2025-12-10 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

  • CISA KEV: listed since 2025-12-15. Source

Public exploit code

Metasploit

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories below quality bar

1 public repositories from 1 accounts, first seen 2025-12-29.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: CISA KEV · Rapid7 Metasploit Framework module metadata · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2025-14611 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 66/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/1

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1078.001 Default Accounts Inferred

Inferred from CWE CWE-798

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

  • gladinet centrestack: upgrade to 16.12.10420.56791 or later
  • gladinet triofox: upgrade to 16.12.10420.56791 or later

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1032 Multi-factor Authentication (for T1078.001) : Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for default accounts whenever possible to prevent unauthorized access, even if credentials for these accounts are compromised. MFA adds an additional layer of security that requires more than just a username and password, making it significantly harder for adversaries to expl
  • M1027 Password Policies (for T1078.001) : Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
  • Persistence: Look for new files in web roots, new scheduled tasks/services, and new accounts created after the exposure window.
  • Privilege Escalation: Alert on processes gaining SYSTEM/root unexpectedly, and on exploitation crashes of privileged services.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources