CVERadar
CRITICAL · CVSS 4.0 10CISA KEV · added 2025-06-25EPSS 60.75% (p99)Threat level 83

CVE-2024-54085: AMI MegaRAC SPx Authentication Bypass by Spoofing Vulnerability

AMI · MegaRAC SPx · NVD published 2025-03-11 · posted 2025-06-25 · last modified 2026-06-17

What it is

AMI’s SPx contains a vulnerability in the BMC where an Attacker may bypass authentication remotely through the Redfish Host Interface. A successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability.

WeaknessCWE-290
CVSS vectorCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X (source: [email protected])
CISA due date2025-07-16 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone)
ATT&CK tacticsResource Development → Privilege Escalation → Lateral Movement → Impact

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2025-06-25 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

  • CISA KEV: listed since 2025-06-25. Source

Public exploit code

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories below quality bar

1 public repositories from 1 accounts, first seen 2025-06-29.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: CISA KEV · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2024-54085 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 83/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/5

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege Escalation

Stealth

Defense Impairment

Credential Access

Discovery

Lateral Movement

Collection

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1608.001 Upload Malware CTID: primary impact

By sending a malicious request to the Redfish Host Interface, an attacker can manipulate the HTTP header, tricking the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) into thinking that the request originates from a trusted source, leading to authentication bypass. This can lead to complete system control, deployment of malware at the firmware level, and network disruptions.

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

  • ami megarac sp-x: upgrade to 12.7 or later (affected from 12)
  • ami megarac sp-x: upgrade to 13.5 or later (affected from 13)

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1056 Pre-compromise (for T1608.001) : This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.
  • M1051 Update Software (for T1068, T1210, T1495) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers.
  • M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1068, T1210) : Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploi
  • M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1068, T1210) : Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. Risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in t
  • M1019 Threat Intelligence Program (for T1068, T1210) : Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization.
  • M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1068) : Consider blocking the execution of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may exploit to execute code in kernel mode. Validate driver block rules in audit mode to ensure stability prior to production deployment.
  • M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program (for T1210) : Minimize available services to only those that are necessary.
  • M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1210) : Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services.
  • M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1210) : Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods.
  • M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1210, T1495) : Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Privilege Escalation: Alert on processes gaining SYSTEM/root unexpectedly, and on exploitation crashes of privileged services.
  • Lateral Movement: Watch for the compromised host authenticating to other internal systems it does not normally talk to.
  • Impact: Monitor service availability, unexpected encryption activity and mass file changes.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources