CVERadar
HIGH · CVSS 3.1 7.8Metasploit modulePublic PoCEPSS 21.27% (p98)Threat level 55

CVE-2024-48990: CVE-2024-48990: Qualys discovered that needrestart, before version 3.8, allows local attackers to execute …

needrestart project · needrestart · NVD published 2024-11-20 · posted 2024-11-19 · last modified 2026-06-17

What it is

Qualys discovered that needrestart, before version 3.8, allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code as root by tricking needrestart into running the Python interpreter with an attacker-controlled PYTHONPATH environment variable.

WeaknessCWE-427
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (source: [email protected])
ATT&CK tacticsExecution → Stealth

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2024-11-19 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).

Public exploit code

Metasploit

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories

18 public repositories from 18 accounts, first seen 2024-11-20. Most starred: makuga01/CVE-2024-48990-PoC (105 stars), view repository.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: Rapid7 Metasploit Framework module metadata · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2024-48990 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 55/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/2

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1574.001 DLL Inferred

Inferred from CWE CWE-427

How to fix it

Fixed versions

  • needrestart project needrestart: upgrade to 3.8 or later

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1574.001) : Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through DLL hijacking by using application control solutions capable of blocking DLLs loaded by legitimate software.
  • M1044 Restrict Library Loading (for T1574.001) : Disallow loading of remote DLLs. This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. Enable Safe DLL Search Mode to move the user's current folder later in the search order. This is included by default in modern versions of Windows; the associated Windows Registry ke
  • M1051 Update Software (for T1574.001, T1203) : Update software regularly to include patches that fix DLL side-loading vulnerabilities.
  • M1047 Audit (for T1574.001) : Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. Use the program `sxstrace.exe` that is included with Windo
  • M1013 Application Developer Guidance (for T1574.001) : When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.
  • M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1203) : Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploi
  • M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1203) : Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. Risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in those systems may still exist.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources