CVE-2024-33896: CVE-2024-33896: Cosy+ devices running a firmware 21.x below 21.2s10 or a firmware 22.x below 22.1s3 are vu…
hms-networks · ewon cosy\+ firmware · NVD published 2024-08-02 · posted 2025-04-10 · last modified 2026-06-17
What it is
Cosy+ devices running a firmware 21.x below 21.2s10 or a firmware 22.x below 22.1s3 are vulnerable to code injection due to improper parameter blacklisting. This is fixed in version 21.2s10 and 22.1s3.
| Weakness | CWE-78 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (source: [email protected]) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Initial Access → Execution |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2025-04-10 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).
Public exploit code
Exploit-DB
- EDB-52160: Cosy+ firmware 21.2s7 - Command Injection (2025-04-10)
Sources: Exploit-DB (OffSec).
Defend the Chain
The attack chain for CVE-2024-33896 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.
Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.
Defend against T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Inferred
Inferred from CWE CWE-78
How to fix it
Fixed versions
- hms-networks ewon cosy\+ firmware: versions up to and including 21.2s10 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
- hms-networks ewon cosy\+ firmware: versions up to and including 22.1s3 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://hmsnetworks.blob.core.windows.net/nlw/docs/default-source/products/cybersecurity/security-advisory/hms-security-advisory-2024-07-29-001--ewon-several-cosy--vulnerabilities.pdf (Vendor Advisory)
- https://www.hms-networks.com/cyber-security (Vendor Advisory)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
- M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
- M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190, T1059) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
- M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1190) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
- M1033 Limit Software Installation (for T1059) : Prevent user installation of unrequired command and scripting interpreters.
- M1045 Code Signing (for T1059) : Where possible, only permit execution of signed scripts.
Detection Generic guidance
- Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
- Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.