CVE-2023-1545: CVE-2023-1545: SQL Injection in GitHub repository nilsteampassnet/teampass prior to 3.0.0.23.
teampass · teampass · NVD published 2023-03-21 · posted 2025-02-22 · last modified 2026-06-17
What it is
SQL Injection in GitHub repository nilsteampassnet/teampass prior to 3.0.0.23.
| Weakness | CWE-89 |
|---|---|
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (source: [email protected]) |
| ATT&CK tactics | Initial Access → Collection |
Exploitation evidence
First exploit evidence seen: 2025-02-22 (earliest date across the sources below).
Exploited in the wild
No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).
Public exploit code
Exploit-DB
- EDB-52094: TeamPass 3.0.0.21 - SQL Injection (2025-03-22)
GitHub proof-of-concept repositories
4 public repositories from 4 accounts, first seen 2025-02-22. Most starred: zer0-dave/CVE-2023-1545-POC (1 stars), view repository.
Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.
Sources: Exploit-DB (OffSec) · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.
Defend the Chain
The attack chain for CVE-2023-1545 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.
Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.
Defend against T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Inferred
Inferred from CWE CWE-89
How to fix it
Fixed versions
- teampass teampass: upgrade to 3.0.0.23 or later
Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/teampass/commit/4780252fdb600ef2ec2758f17a37d738570cbe66 (Patch)
- https://huntr.dev/bounties/942c015f-7486-49b1-94ae-b1538d812bc2 (Exploit, Patch, Third Party Advisory)
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain
- M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1190) : Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access.
- M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1190) : Restrict outbound network traffic from public-facing servers to prevent unauthorized connections from initiating communications with attacker-controlled infrastructure. While this may not prevent the initial exploitation, it limits the attacker's ability to verify and control the compromised server post-exploit, reduci
- M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1190) : Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
- M1016 Vulnerability Scanning (for T1190) : Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
- M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1190) : Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system.
- M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1190) : Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application.
- M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1190) : Ensure that all publicly exposed services are actually intended to be so, and restrict access to any that should only be available internally.
- M1051 Update Software (for T1190) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications.
- M1057 Data Loss Prevention (for T1005) : Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted.
Detection Generic guidance
- Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
- Collection: Watch for bulk reads of databases, file shares or mailboxes by the affected service.
Response checklist Generic guidance
- Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
- Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
- Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
- Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.