CVERadar
MEDIUM · CVSS 3.1 5.5Exploit-DBEPSS 0.65% (p50)Threat level 35

CVE-2022-1257: CVE-2022-1257: Insecure storage of sensitive information vulnerability in MA for Linux, macOS, and Window…

mcafee · agent · NVD published 2022-04-14 · posted 2025-06-26 · last modified 2026-06-17

What it is

Insecure storage of sensitive information vulnerability in MA for Linux, macOS, and Windows prior to 5.7.6 allows a local user to gain access to sensitive information through storage in ma.db. The sensitive information has been moved to encrypted database files.

WeaknessCWE-922
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (source: [email protected])
ATT&CK tacticsPrivilege Escalation

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2025-06-26 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

No source on this site lists in-the-wild exploitation yet (CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV).

Public exploit code

Exploit-DB

  • EDB-52345: McAfee Agent 5.7.6 - Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information (2025-06-26)

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories below quality bar

1 public repositories from 1 accounts, first seen 2025-06-24.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: Exploit-DB (OffSec) · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2022-1257 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 35/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/1

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Inferred

Inferred from description keywords (local flaw)

How to fix it

Fixed versions

  • mcafee agent: upgrade to 5.7.6 or later

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

No vendor-tagged reference yet; see the full reference list.

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1051 Update Software (for T1068) : Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers.
  • M1050 Exploit Protection (for T1068) : Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploi
  • M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing (for T1068) : Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. Risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in t
  • M1019 Threat Intelligence Program (for T1068) : Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization.
  • M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1068) : Consider blocking the execution of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may exploit to execute code in kernel mode. Validate driver block rules in audit mode to ensure stability prior to production deployment.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Privilege Escalation: Alert on processes gaining SYSTEM/root unexpectedly, and on exploitation crashes of privileged services.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources