CVERadar
CRITICAL · CVSS 3.1 9.8CISA KEV · added 2021-11-03EPSS 99.97% (p100)Threat level 94

CVE-2020-25506: D-Link DNS-320 Device Command Injection Vulnerability

D-Link · DNS-320 Device · NVD published 2021-02-02 · posted 2026-10-21 · last modified 2026-06-17

What it is

D-Link DNS-320 FW v2.06B01 Revision Ax is affected by command injection in the system_mgr.cgi component, which can lead to remote arbitrary code execution.

WeaknessCWE-78
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (source: [email protected])
CISA due date2022-05-03 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone)
ATT&CK tacticsResource Development → Initial Access → Persistence → Execution

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2021-11-03 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

  • CISA KEV: listed since 2021-11-03. Source

Sources: CISA KEV.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2020-25506 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 94/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/3

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1584.005 Botnet CTID: secondary impact

CVE-2020-25506 is a command injection vulnerability in the D-Link DNS-320 FW v2.06B01 Revision Ax system_mgr.cgi component, which can lead to remote arbitrary code execution.

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply updates per vendor instructions. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

NVD does not list a fixed version for this CVE. Use the vendor advisory below.

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1056 Pre-compromise (for T1584.005) : This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.
  • M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content (for T1133, T1059) : Restrict all traffic to and from public Tor nodes.
  • M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1133) : Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls.
  • M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program (for T1133, T1059) : Disable or block remotely available services that may be unnecessary.
  • M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1133) : Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems.
  • M1032 Multi-factor Authentication (for T1133) : Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.
  • M1033 Limit Software Installation (for T1059) : Prevent user installation of unrequired command and scripting interpreters.
  • M1045 Code Signing (for T1059) : Where possible, only permit execution of signed scripts.
  • M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1059) : Use application control where appropriate. For example, PowerShell Constrained Language mode can be used to restrict access to sensitive or otherwise dangerous language elements such as those used to execute arbitrary Windows APIs or files (e.g., `Add-Type`).
  • M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware (for T1059) : Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files.

Detection Generic guidance

  • Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
  • Persistence: Look for new files in web roots, new scheduled tasks/services, and new accounts created after the exposure window.
  • Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources