CVERadar
CRITICAL · CVSS 3.1 10CISA KEV · added 2021-11-03Metasploit moduleExploit-DBPublic PoCKnown ransomware useEPSS 100.00% (p100)Threat level 100

CVE-2019-11510: Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability

Ivanti · Pulse Connect Secure · NVD published 2019-05-08 · posted 2026-10-21 · last modified 2026-06-17

What it is

In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability .

WeaknessCWE-22
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (source: [email protected])
CISA due date2022-05-03 (for US federal agencies under BOD; a good deadline for everyone)
ATT&CK tacticsInitial Access → Persistence → Execution → Credential Access → Discovery

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2019-04-24 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

  • CISA KEV: listed since 2021-11-03. Source

Public exploit code

Metasploit

Exploit-DB

  • EDB-47297: Pulse Secure 8.1R15.1/8.2/8.3/9.0 SSL VPN - Arbitrary File Disclosure (Metasploit) (2019-08-21)

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories

13 public repositories from 13 accounts, first seen 2019-08-21. Most starred: projectzeroindia/CVE-2019-11510 (359 stars), view repository.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: CISA KEV · Rapid7 Metasploit Framework module metadata · Exploit-DB (OffSec) · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

Defend the Chain

The attack chain for CVE-2019-11510 laid across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics. Solid cards come from the MITRE CTID KEV mappings; dashed cards are inferred by CVERadar from the CWE or description. Correct defences are real ATT&CK mitigations for that technique.

Threat level 100/100
Defender level 1 · 0 XP
Chain links broken: 0/4

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege Escalation

Stealth

Defense Impairment

Credential Access

Discovery

Lateral Movement

Collection

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Pick a red technique card on the board, then choose the defence that stops it.

Defend against T1133 External Remote Services CTID: exploitation technique

CVE 2019-11510 Pulse Secure Connect is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file disclosure. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to gain access to administrative credentials.

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply updates per vendor instructions. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

NVD does not list a fixed version for this CVE. Use the vendor advisory below.

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

  • M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content (for T1133, T1059) : Restrict all traffic to and from public Tor nodes.
  • M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1133) : Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls.
  • M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program (for T1133, T1059) : Disable or block remotely available services that may be unnecessary.
  • M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1133) : Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems.
  • M1032 Multi-factor Authentication (for T1133) : Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.
  • M1033 Limit Software Installation (for T1059) : Prevent user installation of unrequired command and scripting interpreters.
  • M1045 Code Signing (for T1059) : Where possible, only permit execution of signed scripts.
  • M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1059) : Use application control where appropriate. For example, PowerShell Constrained Language mode can be used to restrict access to sensitive or otherwise dangerous language elements such as those used to execute arbitrary Windows APIs or files (e.g., `Add-Type`).
  • M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware (for T1059) : Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files.
  • M1026 Privileged Account Management (for T1059) : When PowerShell is necessary, consider restricting PowerShell execution policy to administrators. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. PowerShell JEA (Just Enough Administration) may also be used to sandbox administration and limit what c

Detection Generic guidance

  • Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
  • Persistence: Look for new files in web roots, new scheduled tasks/services, and new accounts created after the exposure window.
  • Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.
  • Credential Access: Monitor for credential dumping, unusual LSASS access and sudden authentication from new sources.
  • Discovery: Look for directory listing, file enumeration and reconnaissance commands from service accounts.

Response checklist Generic guidance

  1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
  2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
  3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.

Sources