CVE-2019-0708: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

What it is

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Remote Desktop Services formerly known as Terminal Services when an unauthenticated attacker connects to the target system using RDP and sends specially crafted requests, aka 'Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability'.

Exploitation evidence

First exploit evidence seen: 2019-05-14 (earliest date across the sources below).

Exploited in the wild

• CISA KEV: listed since 2021-11-03. Source

Public exploit code

Metasploit

• auxiliary/scanner/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep: CVE-2019-0708 BlueKeep Microsoft Remote Desktop RCE Check (disclosure 2019-05-14)
• exploit/windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_rce: CVE-2019-0708 BlueKeep RDP Remote Windows Kernel Use After Free (disclosure 2019-05-14)

Exploit-DB

• EDB-46946: Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop - 'BlueKeep' Denial of Service (2019-05-30)
• EDB-47120: Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop - 'BlueKeep' Denial of Service (Metasploit) (2019-07-15)
• EDB-47120: Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop - 'BlueKeep' Denial of Service (Metasploit) (2019-07-15)
• EDB-47416: Microsoft Windows - BlueKeep RDP Remote Windows Kernel Use After Free (Metasploit) (2019-09-24, verified)
• EDB-47416: Microsoft Windows - BlueKeep RDP Remote Windows Kernel Use After Free (Metasploit) (2019-09-24, verified)
• EDB-47683: Microsoft Windows 7 (x86) - 'BlueKeep' Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Remote Windows Kernel Use After Free (2019-11-19)

GitHub proof-of-concept repositories

122 public repositories from 117 accounts, first seen 2019-05-16. Most starred: Ekultek/BlueKeep (1186 stars), view repository.

Verify before running: public PoCs can be malicious. Read the code and only run it in an isolated lab. A PoC means exploit code is public, not that this CVE is exploited in the wild.

Sources: CISA KEV · Rapid7 Metasploit Framework module metadata · Exploit-DB (OffSec) · nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub.

How to fix it

CISA required action

Apply updates per vendor instructions. (source: CISA KEV)

Fixed versions

• siemens rapidpoint 500 firmware: versions up to and including 2.3.2 are affected; check the vendor advisory for the fixed release.

Derived from the NVD CPE configuration (versionEndExcluding / versionEndIncluding). Always confirm with the vendor advisory.

Vendor advisories and patches

• https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708 (Patch, Vendor Advisory)

MITRE ATT&CK mitigations for this chain

• M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content (for T1133) : Restrict all traffic to and from public Tor nodes.
• M1030 Network Segmentation (for T1133) : Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls.
• M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program (for T1133) : Disable or block remotely available services that may be unnecessary.
• M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network (for T1133) : Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems.
• M1032 Multi-factor Authentication (for T1133) : Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.
• M1038 Execution Prevention (for T1059.004) : Use application control where appropriate. On ESXi hosts, the `execInstalledOnly` feature prevents binaries from being run unless they have been packaged and signed as part of a vSphere installation bundle (VIB).
• M1037 Filter Network Traffic (for T1498) : When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting Internet Service Provider (ISP) or by a 3rd party such as a Con

Detection Generic guidance

• Initial Access: Alert on unusual requests to the affected service (odd paths, oversized payloads, exploit strings) in WAF, reverse-proxy and application logs.
• Persistence: Look for new files in web roots, new scheduled tasks/services, and new accounts created after the exposure window.
• Execution: Watch for the service process spawning shells or script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell, sh, bash, python) via EDR process-tree rules.
• Impact: Monitor service availability, unexpected encryption activity and mass file changes.

Response checklist Generic guidance

1. Inventory: find every instance of the affected product and version (include internet-facing and forgotten ones).
2. Patch or mitigate per the vendor advisory; if you cannot patch, remove internet exposure or apply the vendor workaround.
3. Assume compromise if the system was exposed before patching: hunt for the indicators in the advisory and review logs back to the disclosure date.
4. Rotate credentials and secrets stored on or used by the affected system if compromise cannot be ruled out.